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Abstract
This	analysis	looks	at	the	role	of	Wal-Mart	in	Brazil	by	using	glocalisation	theory.	
Glocalisation	refers	to	the	strategies	and	practices	adopted	by	transnational	cor-
porations	to	cater	to	local	cultures	and	customs.	In	the	case	of	Wal-Mart	in	Brazil,	
it	unsuccessfully	attempted	to	impose	the	US	strategy	of	management	practices,	
employee	standards,	low	wages,	EDLP	(every-day-low	pricing)	for	buyers,	fierce	
pressure	on	suppliers,	harsh	anti-union	policies	and	aggressive	expansionism	ten-
dencies.	 In	 this,	Wal-Mart	was	met	with	 heavy	 resistance	because	 it	 failed	 to	
glocalise.	However,	Wal-Mart	changed	tack	or	‘compromised’	by	following	glo-
calisation	principles	and	made	deep	inroads	in	the	Brazilian	market.	This	analysis	
is	important	for	two	reasons.	First	because	it	analyses	the	functioning	of	a	giant	
corporation	 that	 ventured	 into	 unchartered	 territory	 from	 a	 theoretical	 per-
spective;	an	endeavour	that	has	few	scholars	have	hitherto	undertaken.	Second,	
in	recent	years,	there	has	been	scant	consideration	of	the	Brazilian	market	and	
its	role	in	the	global	retailing	process.
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Introduction
This article  analyses the role of Wal-Mart in Brazil, an emerging market, by using 
glocalisation theory. By and large, glocalisation refers to the strategies and prac-
tices adopted by transnational corporations to cater to local cultures and customs. 
In the case of Wal-Mart, it was met with heavy resistance when it first entered 
the Brazilian market in 1995. The reason for this was it failed to glocalise and 
unsuccessfully imposed the management practices adopted in the US namely low 
wages, EDLP (every-day-low pricing) for buyers, fierce pressure on suppliers, 
harsh anti-union policies and aggressive expansionism tendencies. However, after 
careful consideration, Wal-Mart followed the principles of glocalisation. This 
analysis begins with a perspective on globalisation. Specifically described are two 
globalisation trends—Wal-Martisation and glocalisation. An attempt is thereafter 
made to provide a brief history of Wal-Mart in Brazil—from its difficult debut to 
the giant it has become today. What follows is an explanation of why Wal- 
Mart experienced cultural clashes during its earlier days in Brazil. This lays 
the foundation for the centerpiece of this analysis—how Wal-Mart became 
successful—thanks to glocalisation. These glocalisation competencies are 
described through four key themes: (a) glocalisation practices: adapted brands 
and products, (b) glocalisation practices: adapted store lay-outs, (c) glocalisation 
practices: management and work procedures and (d) glocalisation practices: 
logistics and operational procedures. This analysis ends with a discussion section 
that also offers suggestions for future research. 
Globalisation Perspectives
The Columbian exchange was the largest ever international exchange of humans, 
ideas, plants, products and in particular, food (Nicholls, 2009; Whelan & Laden, 
2009). The twenty-first century has witnessed the next-biggest exchange of food, 
as transnational corporations (TNCs) look for new venues of products and new 
markets to enhance their diminishing growth (Selling to the Developing World, 
2003). One of those TNCs is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. During the fiscal year 2008, 
worldwide sales for Wal-Mart already represented a large percentage of its $374.5 
billion in net sales (Clark & Edelson, 2008). For more than a decade, Wal-Mart has 
managed to transfer two-thirds of its capital expenditures to international high-
growth markets (Zimmerman, Bustillo & Lublin, 2008). In fact, Wal-Mart has 
stores in Brazil, another top international market for the global behemoth (Brunn, 
2006; Frazier, 2007; Hays, 2004). While critics claim that the Wal-Martisation of 
the world is detrimental to business, society and culture, others suggest that Wal-
Mart contributes to the economic prosperity of individuals, communities and even 
entire countries by catering to their local tastes and preferences (Welch & Welch, 
2006). This section explains the value of the former statement by comparing two 
current trends in globalisation: Wal-Martisation and glocalisation. 
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Wal-Martisation
Wal-Mart’s ubiquity is one reason it has forced a re-examination of the world 
around it (Marquard, 2006). Wal-Martisation of the world is a process that is cur-
rently happening. ‘Wal-Mart International’, Wal-Mart’s official Website, proudly 
exhibits the exploits and profits of its 4,000 stores in the United States and 3,000 
stores in the other parts of the world. Wal-Martisation refers to the classic method 
of rationalisation of consumer living and the very embodiment of the mottos 
‘faster, better, cheaper’ and ‘bigger, more global’. Wal-Mart reduces prices by half 
because it can (Bosshart, 2007). Other important factors that have facilitated Wal-
Martisation include information technology (i.e., its sophisticated satellite system 
that can track cargo loads to the smallest detail), global sourcing and the growth 
of global consumer segments (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). Wal-Mart’s pervasive 
business model has reached such a pinnacle that it will not only make Wal-Mart 
the first trillion-dollar-a-year corporation soon; it will also spread its supercenters 
up to every two miles (Butler, 2005).
Wal-Martisation also entails the notion of organic growth. Organic growth is 
the method by which a TNC expands as a result of increased output, sales or 
both (Blass, 2009; Steil & Hinds, 2009). Wal-Mart’s organic growth is enabled 
through new store development within an integrated corporate framework. 
TNCs like to follow the strategy of replicating domestic operations in the 
rest of the world (Ward, 2004). Through organic growth, a corporation can 
preserve operational control and maintain its identity and brand awareness 
(Coe & Hess, 2005). Organic growth guarantees that financial and manage-
ment control be kept within the premises of the parent company, while multi-
ple branches of the corporations are operated overseas (Cole et al., 2005). 
Wal-Mart claims it can generate extensive organic growth by providing services 
to roughly 140 million consumers already flocking to its stores on a weekly basis 
(Bowers, 2006). Wal-Martisation is synonymous with the image of an unstoppable 
discount, ‘big box’ retailer, an image upon which Wal-Mart wants to thrive, 
especially with respect to its large-scale supply-chain management style 
(Burchman & Jones, 2005).
From all this, it seems that organic growth goes perfectly hand-in-hand with 
the Wal-Martisation model (Swoboda, Schwarz & Hälsig, 2007). Yet, as this anal-
ysis will point out, the Wal-Martisation of the world has not been free from prob-
lems. Many of these problems pertain to incongruity in the local cultures in which 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. operates. A primary flaw of the South American market has 
been its economic instability; a major culprit has been high inflation. For a long 
time, national economies have fluctuated between elevated levels of public debt 
and hyperinflation. Brazil was no exception (Alexander & de Lira e Silva, 2002). 
Therefore, in South America, the practice of organic growth alone was set to fail. 
In order to survive, Wal-Mart had to follow another globalisation strategy; it is 
called glocalisation. 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sch.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Social Change, 43, 1 (2013): 1–19
4	 	 Jonathan Matusitz and Elizabeth Minei
Glocalisation
As Kotler, Fahey and Jatusripitak (1986) suggest, the entry of a corporation 
into a foreign market necessitates more detailed examination and imagin- 
ation than it normally would if it were to compete in its own domestic market. 
Scholars on international retailing have highlighted the unique challenges 
and opportunities that companies face when operating on a global scale (Bennison 
& Gardner, 1995; Burt, 1991; Davies & Jones, 1993; Davies & Sanghavi, 1995; 
Goldman, 1981; Ho & Sin, 1987; Kaynak, 1980; Lord, Moran, Parker & 
Sparks, 1988; Martenson, 1987; McGoldrick & Ho, 1992; Muniz-Martinez, 1998; 
Sparks, 1995; Treadgold, 1991). A theoretical concept that scholars have 
associated with this is glocalisation. Glocalisation, a term coined by Robertson 
(1994), refers to the set of strategies adopted by a multinational corporation— 
e.g., a retailer—to sell products and services by catering to the local culture 
in which the corporation is located (Kraidy, 2002). In this context, rather than 
imposing its US blueprint of management approaches, employee practices, low 
wages, EDLP (every-day-low pricing) for buyers, fierce pressure on suppliers, 
harsh anti-union policies and aggressive expansionism tendencies, Wal-Mart has 
had to compromise. That is, it had to show so much flexibility that it eventually 
changed the core elements of its corporate image and culture (Featherstone, 
2004).
For example, as explained in detail later, Wal-Mart in Brazil had to change 
the format of its local stores (e.g., store layout and methods of stocking goods). 
Glocalising on the premise of store format is a common and essential practice for 
many international retailers. Research has shown that different degrees of success 
have been achieved based on the extent of glocalising (Evans, Treadgold & 
Mavondo, 2000). Glocalisation deals with marketing orientation and awareness of 
cultural distance (Alexander & de Lira e Silva, 2002). The problem that Wal-Mart 
faced when entering Brazil was its inability to find its way into a South American 
market of which it had relatively little knowledge, a market in which its traditional 
organic growth strategy and its gigantic U.S. supercentres no longer attracted cus-
tomers as it does in places like Denver and Jacksonville (Zimmerman, Bustillo & 
Lublin, 2008). 
Glocalisation for Wal-Mart in Brazil was no longer an option; it became a 
necessity. The South American Market represented a ‘tried-and-tested’ market 
for a newly arrived retailer. Simply put, Wal-Mart was navigating in ‘uncharted 
waters’, and thus incurred greater risks (Hernandez & Biasiotto, 2001). The key 
was to carefully evaluate its position and strategic impact in Brazil, utilising 
factors not just derived from its typical corporate approach but also from the cul-
tural environment in which the company was located. From a glocalisation stand-
point, while core company competencies remain important, certain functions and 
roles need to be modified so that the company can compete successfully in a new 
marketplace (Burchman & Jones, 2005).
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Description of Wal-Mart in Brazil
Wal-Mart entered the Brazilian retail industry in 1995, in the state of Sao Paulo, 
through a joint venture and subsequent acquisition of Lojas Americanas, one 
of Brazil’s largest non-food retailers and a company of the Garantia group 
(Alexander & Doherty, 2009). Wal-Mart’s founder, Sam Walton, had an ongoing 
friendship with Jorge Lemann, a major founder of the Garantia Group and key 
shareholder of Lojas Americanas. This friendship led to the formation of ties 
between the two retailers (Jordan, 2001). In fact, Lojas Americanas executives 
visited Wal-Mart to gain management expertise. Sam Walton was convinced 
that Brazil was an ideal market for discount operations and persuaded Lojas 
Americanas’ managers to venture into other regions of the country (Lemann & 
Sicupira, 1992). When Wal-Mart’s chief executives entered the Brazilian market, 
the alliance with Lojas Americanas was a natural development of ties that existed 
already. Lojas Americanas had a stake of 40 per cent in Wal-Mart Brazil but 
Wal-Mart USA was the one to manage the joint-venture (da Rocha & Dib, 2002).
For Wal-Mart, South America was the first geographical area where cultural 
habits differed sharply from those in the United States (Quelch & Deshpande, 
2004). In South America, the percentage of all food expenditures spent in super-
markets skyrocketed from 15 per cent in 1990 to 60 per cent in 2000. It is still 
rising rapidly (Popkin, 2007). Nevertheless, in South America, while Brazil had a 
75 per cent segment of supermarkets in food retail store sales, Bolivia only had, 
at the most, 10 per cent (Reardon, Timmer, Barrett & Berdegue, 2003). This was 
another reason for Wal-Mart to invest there. Wal-Mart’s goal to enter the Brazilian 
market was to replicate the success it had in Mexico (Dolan, 2004a). Brazil was 
dominated by a handful of gigantic companies, including Carrefour (the market 
leader) and Pao de Acucar and Sendas (Roberts, 2009). According to 1995 data, 
Brazil’s supermarket industry represented 6.6 per cent of its GNP (the equivalent 
of US $43.7 billion). The 1997 data reveal that Wal-Mart’s major competitors 
were Carrefour, CBD (Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição), Royal Ahold and 
Makro Atacadista (Kotabe & Helsen, 2007). Nevertheless, as early as in 1993, 
before Wal-Mart ventured in Brazil, its retailing industry had sales of US$39 
billion. In 1999, total sales of the Brazilian industry amounted to approximately 
US$48 billion, an increase of 23 per cent in six years. During the same year, 
there were over 51,000 supermarket and hypermarket stores that operated there 
(da Rocha & Dib, 2002).
For the past few years, Wal-Mart in Brazil has come into its own. For 
example, in 2004, the giant retailer bought Bompreço (which translates as ‘good 
price’ in Portuguese), a 188-store supermarket chain in the northeast, for $300 
million (Benson, 2004; Borges, Hoppen & Luce, 2008; Gibbon & Ponte, 2005; 
Krippendorff, 2008). This Bompreço acquisition made Wal-Mart the third-largest 
Brazilian retailer, with $1.6 billion in sales (whereas before it only held the sixth 
position) (Dolan, 2004b, Samor, 2005). During the same year, Wal-Mart also 
purchased the Ahold stores, the third largest Brazilian supermarket chain, which 
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had to leave Brazil due to international problems (Farina, Nunes & Monteiro, 
2005). Even though Wal-Mart is only 50 per cent the size of CBD (Companhia 
Brasileira de Distribuição), the 2004 acquisitions were only the beginning of Wal-
Mart’s success in the most populated country of South America (Dolan, 2004b). 
And Wal-Mart grew quickly. In 2005 alone, Wal-Mart added another 118 stores 
(Kitchens, 2005). A report by the Brazilian Supermarkets’ Association revealed 
that Wal-Mart’s total annual sales exceeded $500 million. In the same year, Wal-
Mart acquired Sonae SGPS SA (a Brazilian operations of Portuguese retailer) for 
$757 million (Samor, 2005). In 2006, Wal-Mart opened or acquired about 25 addi-
tional stores in Brazil and reached the same level of growth in 2007 (Fochtman, 
2007; Kotabe & Helsen, 2007). 
Today, Wal-Mart in Brazil has almost 350 stores and employs over 70,000 
people (The Associated Press, 2008). Wal-Mart plans to increase its operations 
in Brazil, during the fiscal year of 2009, by investing 1.6 billion U.S. dollars and 
building another 80 to 90 stores. This will constitute the largest investment by 
Wal-Mart in Brazil since its entry in 1995. The investment was announced by 
Hector Nunez, the president of Wal-Mart in Brazil during a meeting in Brasilia 
(the capital city) with Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the former Brazilian President. 
This new investment was expected to generate more than 9,000 jobs for the 
country. Wal-Mart executives claim they have invested 1.85 billion U.S. dollars 
in Brazil between 2004 and 2008 (The Associated Press, 2008).
Despite all the aforementioned facts that can ascertain Wal-Mart’s success in 
Brazil, the U.S. giant retailer had a difficult time adjusting to the South American 
shopping and corporate climate during the first few years of its Brazilian venture. 
In fact, in the beginning, Wal-Mart faced major cultural clashes, which are thor-
oughly described in the next section. 
Wal-Mart in Brazil: Cultural Clashes
When Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. entered the Brazil supermarket industry in 1995, 
many scholars and commentators thought it would be an immediate success—
Brazil being South America’s largest country and market. Within a few weeks 
following Wal-Mart’s opening of its first supercentre in Sao Paulo, Wal-Mart 
looked like it was thriving. The parking lot was fully occupied by 9:30 a.m. on a 
Saturday. Avid customers were lining up for two hours to get a roasted chicken for 
$2.80, 30 per cent less than at nearby supermarkets (Dolan, 2004a). Unfortunately, 
things quickly turned sour for Wal-Mart. As opposed to Wal-Mart’s success- 
ful experience in Mexico, where its adoption of a forceful, but courageous 
approach of acquisitions quickly turned the U.S. retailer into a dominant force, 
Wal-Mart’s first years in Brazil proved largely fruitless. Within the early years 
of Wal-Mart’s entry in Brazil, its annual performance was routinely meagre 
because it failed to adapt its US practices there (Quelch & Deshpande, 2004). In 
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its first years in Brazil, Wal-Mart had no choice but to tread cautiously. It only 
opened 25 stores in four of Brazil’s 27 states.  
Generally, new competitors are seen as either more threatening or less threat-
ening. The level of threat depends on the extent to which new entrants defy 
established industry rules, they have goals that are more or less ambitious and 
they considerably perturb current competitors’ positions (Porter, 1985). Based 
on Porter’s classification, Wal-Mart was considered a ‘bad’ competitor because 
it refused to play by the rules of the Brazilian market. Indeed, Wal-Mart was 
adamant to impose, on Brazilians, its US blueprint of shopping practices, manage-
ment styles, employee practices, store lay-outs and intense pressure on suppliers 
(Featherstone, 2004), without making any attempt to glocalise. Not only were 
Brazilian consumers’ responses strong, but competitors’ responses were strong 
too. Wal-Mart’s resentment and persistence were instant but inefficient. Although 
Wal-Mart’s entry was perceived as playing a major role in the modernisation of 
Brazilian retailing, it was also seen as clashing with Brazilian cultural values (da 
Rocha & Dib, 2002). 
Simply put, cultural clashes were the main culprit because Wal-Mart was not 
adapting to local tastes and differences. Instead, it stocked its stores with brands 
and products that are common in the United States—e.g., golf clubs and lawn 
mowers—but that are insignificant to most Brazilian consumers (Benson, 2004). 
Products that are popular in US stores may meet strong opposition abroad. As 
Hays (2004) acknowledges, there was noticeable resistance to the encroachment 
of the US company on local businesses. Wal-Mart endured difficult years adapt-
ing to the market. It vehemently imported its Bentonville, Arkansas practices only 
to discover that US working practices and consumer behavior did not suit its 
operational approach (Alexander & de Lira e Silva, 2002). In essence, Wal-Mart 
executives ignored the buying habits of Brazilians and took the shortcut of assum-
ing that they would purchase products in the American way. Besides, Wal-Mart 
did not consider the differences in logistics that they would encounter in Brazil. 
Consequently, the first attempts at establishing facilities in Brazil were failures 
(Fernandez & Shengjun, 2007; Stanat, West & Stanta, 2000).
Wal-Mart’s strategies and retailing practices were deemed aggressive by local 
consumers and competitors in the Brazilian market. Its long-established notori-
ety for destroying small businesses in the United States, as it built new stores 
from one town to another (Peterson & McGee, 2000), frightened local competi-
tors in that foreign market (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). Even scarier was Wal-Mart’s 
unwillingness to ‘bend’ and take the Brazilian direction. As we can see, what was 
missing in Wal-Mart was a lack of complementarity that was needed to fill the 
gaps, to bridge misunderstandings between Wal-Mart USA and Wal-Mart Brazil. 
Management failed to look into strategic flexibility (Palmer, 2006). Flexibility is 
a vital practice for organisational survival in a foreign market. Flexibility equals 
glocalisation. The following section explains, in detail, the glocalisation strategies 
adopted by Wal-Mart in order to meet appropriate levels of cultural adjustment.
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Glocalisation: Cultural Adjustment in Brazil
The failure of Wal-Mart’s introduction of US-based blueprint of corporate strate-
gies to the Brazilian market prompted executives to launch a series of structural 
changes in Brazilian retailing (Uusitalo, 2004). Put simply, Wal-Mart developed 
core glocalisation competencies within the Brazilian market at large. These glo-
calisation competencies are described through four key themes: (a) glocalisation 
practices: adapted brands and products, (b) glocalisation practices: adapted 
store lay-outs, (c) glocalisation practices: management and work procedures and 
(d) glocalisation practices: logistics and operational procedures. 
Glocalisation Practices: Adapted Brands  
and Products
According to Chain Store Age (2000), establishing a Wal-Mart supercentre in a 
South American market is easy. The major obstacle is adapting the brands and 
products to the local culture. By and large, Wal-Mart executives disregarded the 
shopping habits of Brazilians and did not take into account that their consumer 
practices would differ sharply from those in the United States (Fernandez & 
Shengjun, 2007). From this vantage point, when it entered the Brazilian market, 
Wal-Mart was unsuccessful in exporting its cookie-cutter blueprint for success in 
the United States to Brazil (Stanat, West & Stanta, 2000). This shortage of cultural 
awareness gave Wal-Mart issues. For instance, with respect to the shopping of 
white goods (inexpensive, generic brands), customs in Brazil rule that they be 
delivered by the store, with those costs included in product prices (due to the 
smaller size of vehicles and city layouts). In the United States, however, tradition 
has it that Wal-Mart stores do not deliver at all (da Rocha & Dib, 2002).
In line with these contentions, Brazilian housewives, on a daily basis, listen 
to the radio when they are doing house chores. For that reason, radio advertise-
ments would be a great outlet to reach and draw potential shoppers. Wal-Mart 
failed to utilise radio as a means for advertising its brands and products to its 
customers. Rather, the company unsuccessfully resorted to television and news-
paper advertising. The percentage allocated to the total advertising campaign 
represents only 2 per cent of Wal-Mart’s revenues. Although Wal-Mart collabo-
rated with a Brazilian advertising agency, it did not grant the agency creative 
licence or freedom to blend advertising with inherently local qualities (Kotabe & 
Helsen, 2007).
Another problem was that the majority of Wal-Mart’s brands and products 
were non-food items. Wal-Mart’s product mix consisted too greatly of general 
merchandise rather than food items (Alexander & de Lira e Silva, 2002). This 
contrasted with the Carrefour retail chain, which dedicated less than 50 per cent 
to non-food items, whereas Wal-Mart allocated 70 per cent of its sales to non-food 
items. Wal-Mart eventually glocalised; it decreased the ratio of non-food items 
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from 70 per cent to 50 per cent of the total sales area (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). 
Even though Wal-Mart made the attempt to have a proportionate ratio of food to 
non-food items, the company’s efforts did not initially reflect the market needs. 
For example, Wal-Mart’s unawareness about Brazilian preferences concerning 
cuts of beef turned off many potential customers (Hays, 2004). According to Peck 
(2003), Wal-Mart decided to cater to the Brazilian masses and changed its policy 
with respect to cuts of beef. 
Likewise, Wal-Mart realised that what is popular in Dallas, TX, does not 
necessarily work in Sao Paulo. Tanks of live trout have been replaced by sushi. 
American footballs are out; soccer balls are in. The ingredients for feijoadas, 
a mixture of beef and pork in black bean stew (Robinson, 2009), are available 
at the deli counter (Rodrigues, 2008). Wal-Mart is now aggrandising its assort-
ment of fresh rolls in the bakery section (Dolan, 2004a). After Wal-Mart found 
that Brazilians frequently soak vegetables in vinegar solutions as a precaution-
ary measure, many vinegar and lemon juice products were stocked up in shelves 
(Chang & Fang, 2007; Costa, Thomaz-Soccol, Paulino & Castro, 2009). This 
move indicates that Wal-Mart actively looks to increase its market diversity by 
catering to local tastes and differences.
A major effort toward glocalisation occurred when Wal-Mart changed its 
position toward organic food in Brazil. Originally, the Organic Consumers 
Association (OCA) claimed that Wal-Mart confused customers by overusing the 
label ‘organic’ on its brands and products. This left consumers perplexed as to 
what was ‘organic’ and what was not. The association was also worried that Wal-
Mart was selling cheap organic food obtained from Brazil itself (a country where 
labour and environmental regulations are still known to be negligent) and not 
from the United States, where organic food regulations are more rigid. OCA also 
noticed that Wal-Mart was over-relying on organic milk farmed in factories at 
the expense of smaller, local Brazilian suppliers (Wrigley & Currah, 2003). After 
ten years, Wal-Mart finally concluded that organic growth was not a successful 
approach for growth in Brazil (Benson, 2004).
Presently, Wal-Mart is more attuned to its Brazilian consumer base by recog-
nising the need for mainstreaming and tropicalising its product offerings. Brazil 
represents a southern hemisphere market where people consume less Gatorade 
and Minute Maid than cachaca, a kind of spirit distilled from sugarcane and 
the national drink of Brazil (St. Louis, Raub, Clark & Noble, 2008). Speaking 
of Brazil’s favorite beverage, the price of a litre of cachaca is, on average, 
90 centavos (about 40 cents). Wal-Mart included a great amount of cachaca on 
its shelves. Various spirits like whiskey and rum, two types of liquor appreciated 
by Brazilians, can be sampled freely in Bompreço, which, as mentioned earlier in 
this analysis, was acquired by Wal-Mart (Abramson et al., 2006).
Wal-Mart’s glocalisation with regards to non-food items has also contrib-
uted to a wider acceptance from its Brazilian consumer base. For instance, Wal-
Mart learned a valuable lesson in the fashion department. Because Brazil is in 
the southern hemisphere, it does not automatically follow the fashion cycles 
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headquartered in the northern hemisphere (Alexander & de Lira e Silva, 2002). 
Local stores in places like Visconde de Pirajá en Ipanema, a community in Rio 
de Janeiro, have the hippest boutiques, with the finest leather goods, sportswear, 
jewellery and other items (Marshall & Jenkins, 2008). Wal-Mart not only catered 
to Brazilian local practices by adding more of such chic products in its stores, but 
it also adjusted its prices to reflect Brazil’s purchasing power. As such, a pair of 
jeans priced at $19.99 in the United States is sold at $9.99 in places like Sao Paulo 
(Rodrigues, 2008).
Lastly, Wal-Mart executives quickly figured out that the Brazilian working 
class ought to be the company’s primary target group. The Brazilian working class 
is known to rely on credit in order to obtain certain types of products, a service 
that Wal-Mart did not offer. Adaptations were necessary. Consequently, Wal-
Mart introduced postdated checks, a general practice in Brazilian retailing, where 
46 per cent of all supermarket sales were done via postdated checks. Wal-Mart 
also engaged in partnership with a prominent bank for longer-term consumer 
financing (da Rocha & Dib, 2002).
Glocalisation Practices: Adapted Store Layouts
Wal-Mart made other mistakes in Brazil. Initially, store lay-outs were exact copies 
of those in the United States (Dolan, 2004a). For Brazilians, the aisles in its super-
markets were too narrow. Wal-Mart had not considered the fact that shopping in 
Brazil is an excursion that includes the entire family. Consequently, aisles needed 
to accommodate every member of the family, from the grandparents down to the 
little ones. Small aisles presented another problem to the shoppers whose bulk of 
their shopping occurs once a month on pay day (Almeida, 1995; Mayer, 2005). 
Wal-Mart adapted by widening the aisles (Selling to the Developing World, 2003).
Part of the globalisation of Wal-Mart was to replicate a large hypermarket 
format worldwide (Wrigley & Currah, 2003). Not only did the aisles need to be 
larger, but the entire supercenter needed to be bigger too, because of the greater 
number of food items bought by the typical Brazilian customer every time they 
visit the store. As a result, Brazilian stores today are 10 to 15 per cent larger than 
their US counterparts, with more room between rows of shelves to allow shop-
ping carts to circulate more freely (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). Nevertheless, any new 
Wal-Mart store to be built will be smaller than supercenters in the past. Its new 
size will range from 140,000 square feet to 170,000 square feet. Castro-Wright 
said Wal-Mart has determined that smaller stores are more productive in terms 
of sales per square foot (Clark & Edelson, 2008). In 2008, Wal-Mart executives 
anticipated that they would decrease the square footage of units by about 19 per 
cent in 2009. This strategy aims at building more stores and, therefore, adding 
an additional 34 to 36 million square feet of retail space in 2009, in comparison 
with 42 to 43 million square feet of retail space in 2008 (Bustillo & Zimmerman, 
2008).
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New Wal-Mart stores in Brazil now allocate twice as much space to sell food 
as the US stores. As a precaution against confusion and theft, stores have one 
entrance, instead of two (Dolan, 2004a). In 2001, Wal-Mart opened its first Todo 
Dia store in Sapopemba, a region east of Sao Paulo. Todo Dia, named as such 
by Wal-Mart, is a low-priced neighborhood store (Kryzanek, 2008). Because 
Sapopemba is populated mostly by less affluent people (Caldeira, 2001), Wal-
Mart realised that fewer items were needed. As opposed to a regular Wal-Mart 
store carrying 60,000 items, Wal-Mart’s Todo Dia only sells 12,000 items. 
Because Todo Dia is a smaller store, its inventory is stocked directly above display 
shelves. Some commentators have observed Wal-Mart’s capitalisation on the Todo 
Dia store format in that geographic area is a means of testing the Brazilian market 
for potential growth in other local and value-conscious neighborhoods (Kotabe & 
Helsen, 2007).
Glocalisation Practices: Management  
and Work Procedures
A major component of Wal-Mart’s glocalisation strategy was to alter its US 
formula of work practices to conform to Brazilian corporate culture. For example, 
after identifying the need to hire local professionals, Wal-Mart is now head- 
hunting professionals from local competitors (Kotabe & Helsen, 2007). Recently, 
Wal-Mart executives hired Brazilian officials who were in high positions in other 
stores of the country’s retailing industry. This movement has already led to an 
increase in retailing executives’ bonuses (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). Since Brazilians 
are now hired in upper-management positions, recruitment of employees has been 
much better managed (Alexander & de Lira e Silva, 2002). This increase of mana-
gerial autonomy was advantageous for Wal-Mart in Brazil because of disparities 
in income and culture between US and Brazilian markets. After all, even today 
Wal-Mart in Brazil has not entirely grasped or implemented the concept of 
‘Management by Walking Around’, Sam Walton’s approach of getting out of his 
office, talking to employees and customers and even pitching in to help 
(Kahnweiler, 2009). An example of a bad management policy (as a result of inter-
cultural differences) is a defective product mix and misallocation of store-space. 
Thus far, newly hired local managers in Brazil have performed well, based on 
store sales volume (Kotabe & Helsen, 2007).
Managers now have more freedom on a micro level. They fix prices below 
cost to simulate demand and drive up sales volume numbers. Thanks to Wal-Mart, 
‘price wars’ are the most obvious outcome of intense competition (Kotabe & 
Helsen, 2007). Wal-Mart has also been triumphant in its reliance upon change 
agents (i.e., opinion makers or catalysts for change). There are people in Brazil 
who can, with their reputation, charisma, prowess, or excitement, influence the 
opinions of others. As we know, influence, in and of itself, does not correlate 
with title. Wal-Mart embodied Gladwell’s (2002) tipping point, or the point in 
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which the momentum for transformation becomes inescapable in that Wal-Mart’s 
primary focus was on gaining the support of Bompreço early adopters—the influ-
ential individuals, those naturally open to the Wal-Mart way. In turn, they recruited 
other followers: the early majority, the late majority and ultimately, the laggards. 
This lasted until Bompreço was ready for opting to be Wal-Mart (Krippendorff, 
2008).
Another advantage for Wal-Mart to have a Brazilian upper-management 
system lies in the fact that employees are better able to accept beliefs that do not 
clash with those of their current belief system. This allows ‘Wal-Mart in Brazil’ 
to maintain a local identity. For example, going back to the Bompreço acquisi-
tion, when customers shop at various Bompreço stores, they may not even be 
aware that they are buying from a Wal-Mart-owned store. The only indicator of 
belonging to Wal-Mart is a small tag that reads ‘Part of the Wal-Mart Family,’ 
located underneath the Bompreço logo (Krippendorff, 2008). Wal-Mart in Brazil 
also managed to win internal networks. First, it did a study of the acquisition tar-
get’s culture to gauge how similar it was to Wal-Mart’s culture. Not surprisingly, 
it was found that prospective targets from different cultures are less likely to adopt 
the Wal-Mart way. Since Bompreço was already acknowledged in the Brazilian 
culture, it was not difficult for Wal-Mart officials to ask Bompreço employees to 
align with Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Therefore, what was required of them 
was not much of a leap (Krippendorff, 2008).
Second, Wal-Mart won internal networks by letting its employees choose 
accountability. Accountability refers to allowing someone to judge the actions of 
another person (Louis, 2006). It is most effective when enacted by the person held 
accountable. Wal-Mart was clever in giving its new Bompreço employees as much 
leeway as possible. Instead of indoctrinating them into the Bentonville, Arkansas 
way, Wal-Mart glocalised by spending a great length of time studying its foreign 
culture and eventually, inviting the new members into the fold (Krippendorff, 
2008). Just like many nations in South America, Brazil has well-established trade 
unions (Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). Although Wal-Mart 
was reluctant to accept the existence of unions in its premises, it finally bent 
and reached an agreement with unions concerning specific workers’ rights issues 
(Featherstone, 2004).
Glocalisation Practices: Logistics and  
Operational Procedures
As soon as it entered the Brazilian market, Wal-Mart was presented with a multi-
tude of operational problems. For instance, the number of visitors was a problem. 
The quantity of people going to the store was so colossal that Wal-Mart executives 
resorted to regulating customers entering the store (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). 
Occasionally, Wal-Mart was forced to shut down its doors early due to sold-out 
merchandise. Along the same lines, after the opening, parking lot congestion was 
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typical during the initial days. In addition, in order to stall the influx of new 
customers to its premises, the store had to delay its advertising campaign 
(da Rocha & Dib, 2002).
Not only did Wal-Mart have issues with customers; it also had difficulties with 
respect to its relationships with suppliers. As already implied throughout this 
analysis, cultural differences were overlooked when standards of operations and 
logistics in US Wal-Mart stores were unsuccessfully applied to its Brazilian sup-
pliers (Fernandez & Shengjun, 2007). The retailer-manufacturer relationship in 
Brazil is quite different from that in the United States. As such, oligopoly is what 
typifies the Brazilian industry; only a handful of companies control 50 per cent 
to 80 per cent market share of products consumed on a daily basis by the masses. 
This means that only those few large manufacturers hold most of the bargain-
ing power (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). Although Wal-Mart had minimal branches, 
it capitalised on its ‘future growth’ blueprint to sway manufacturers into giving 
special discounts. 
Wal-Mart’s strategy did not work; when the store started to sell a wide range 
of products at a cheap price, certain manufacturers and local suppliers reacted 
negatively by refusing to sell to Wal-Mart and by refusing to provide discounts 
in exchange for delivery to its distribution centres. These manufacturers felt that 
Wal-Mart’s practice of selling merchandise below cost was an unfair business 
practice and local retailers were encouraged to boycott by refusing the sale of 
leading brands from manufacturers that were perceived as being advantageous to 
Wal-Mart (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). By the same token, companies worked hard to 
neutralise Wal-Mart’s actions. They took three major actions: (a) suppliers were 
pressured; (b) these supplies were threatened of legal sanctions; and (c) compa-
nies engaged in self-regulation. Overall, the result was that only 15 per cent of all 
merchandise (roughly 40 per cent of sales) got delivered to the distribution centre. 
Consequently, as much as 40 per cent of products were unavailable in the shelves 
at the supercenters (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). Wal-Mart also suffered an astound-
ing 40 per cent stock-out rate in Brazil, in comparison to 5 per cent in the United 
States. The stock-out rate might have decreased since then, but the problem is not 
even close to being totally eliminated. Specifically, Brazilian suppliers are slow 
in using logistics technology, which makes computerised inventory management 
systems ineffective (Fernandez & Shengjun, 2007).
Yet another unexpected problem that Wal-Mart experienced was the reaction 
to the pace of execution regarding operations. Brazilian management, agitated 
at the pace of expansion, became frustrated with negotiations concerning local 
partnerships with suppliers. The traditional Brazilian expansion norms of a ‘wait 
and see’ approach to store development (Palmer, 2006) did not mesh well with 
the aggressive expansion pace typical for Wal-Mart stores in the United States 
(da Rocha & Dib, 2002). The rationale behind this notion is that Wal-Mart, not 
used to the patience required in a partnership venture, felt that the pace of expan-
sion was moving too slowly rendering them with less control over the outcome 
of the business. This resulted in tension and altercations with business partners 
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(Palmer, 2006). Tensions over pace also seemed to be a problem in regards to 
shipping and having products stocked on time (Kotabe & Helsen, 2007). Constant 
traffic jams and well known accounts of bumper-to-bumper traffic on the streets of 
Sao Paulo prevented deliveries from reaching their final destination to both Wal-
Mart stores and distribution centres in a timely and acceptable manner custom to 
strictures in the United States (Han, Kwon, Bae & Sung, 2002).
Despite the numerous problems that Wal-Mart faced, the franchise was suc-
cessful in altering some deeply rooted Brazilian market supply practices. The 
company established the supply practices by increasing the volume of pallets used 
(90 per cent of all items are delivered on pallets) and the establishment of deliv-
ery deadlines (for a 100 per cent of all items delivered). In other areas, adaption 
to local supply practices was necessary to prevail (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). In a 
similar vein, Wal-Mart opened a new distribution centre, in a city called Barueri, 
in the Sao Paulo vicinity (Loiselle et al., 2003). Although Wal-Mart only had 
three rented distribution centres with limited capacity before acquiring the one 
at Barueri, this new facility boasts 35,000 square meters of storage space and is 
constructed on a 200,000 square metre land lot. This new distribution centre can 
accommodate goods or merchandise for 20 local stores at its current size. It also 
allows Wal-Mart to exert better control over supply lines and plan for future build-
ing expansion (Kotabe & Helsen, 2007).
Discussion and Future Directions
This analysis has demonstrated that the glocalisation of Wal-Mart in Brazil has 
redefined the nature of the retail structure within the region. Glocalisation has given 
Wal-Mart acquisition opportunities that would not be available had it pursued its 
aggressive Wal-Martisation strategy (e.g., organic growth). In the beginning, Wal-
Mart was forcefully trying to impose its extensive gamut of US tastes and practices 
without taking local Brazilian consumers into account (Alexander & de Lira e 
Silva, 2002). From the onset (in 1995), Brazil presented particular cultural chal-
lenges. Yet, for the past few years, Wal-Mart has revamped its strategies and, con-
sequently, achieved a sizeable share of the Brazilian market environment. Prospects 
for the future are optimistic for Wal-Mart in Brazil (Kotabe & Helsen, 2007).
This analysis has also shown that companies can misread things. Once a global 
behemoth decides to enter a foreign market, it should prepare to face resistance 
from the locals and from competitors in an unknown marketplace. Even with 
the largest financial backing at its disposal (in fact, it remains the largest in the 
world), Wal-Mart’s path to global expansion can hardly be considered smooth. 
Over the course of time, Wal-Mart in Brazil has learned to adapt to the local 
market. Wal-Mart has grown to be ‘a new organism’, with new vital organs differ-
ent from those of its Bentonville, AK headquarters (Krippendorff, 2008). As we 
have seen, the new vital organs have come to existence thanks to four competen-
cies of glocalisation (i.e., adapted brands and products, adapted store lay-outs, 
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management and work procedures and logistics and operational procedures). A 
key argument in the glocalisation department was the importance for Wal-Mart 
to diversify by expanding new product-markets and moving away from certain 
product-markets. The broader product mix of Wal-Mart in Brazil became a major 
appeal to local consumers (da Rocha & Dib, 2002). Other glocalisation strate-
gies include changes in retail practices, changes in store size and even changes in 
standard operational procedures (da Rocha & Dib, 2002).
Statistics have proven that glocalisation has made Wal-Mart a successful venture 
in Brazil. As a case in point, Wal-Mart’s fiscal fourth-quarter profit increased by 
4 per cent there; again, this rise happened in just three months (McWilliams, 2008). 
Now that Wal-Mart is triumphing in Brazil, it will dedicate a larger portion of its 
international budget to this nation, now widely regarded as an emerging market 
(Bustillo & Zimmerman, 2008). For future research, it might prove interesting to 
continue examining the role of glocalisation in corporations’ attempt to conquer 
the globe. Specifically, the following questions need to be addressed: Is there a 
risk of trampling over what the local culture already has to offer in the quest to 
glocalise? Likewise, is there too much diffusion at the expense of the existing 
culture? And can a company like Wal-Mart be in danger of losing its identity—
i.e., the one that made the company ‘Wal-Mart’ as we know it today—because the 
company increasingly modifies its strategies and practices to fit local cultures? 
As Roudometof (2005) suggests, glocalisation provides a dual conception of 
cosmopolitanism: a situational ‘openness’ in a local milieu and a disconnection 
from local ties. It might prove useful to examine whether the latter—that is, the 
detachment—causes the local culture to become part of a global cultural osmosis 
(Quelch & Jocz, 2008) or cultural convergence (Booth, 2008). This type of research 
would provide a fertile ground for understanding the colossal corporate impact on 
local cultures—maybe to the point of somewhat eroding them—within an increas-
ingly global environment. Conventional human relationships, groupings and identi-
ties wear down along with the progression of foreign corporate invasion (Boholm, 
2003). Scholars have not yet quantified the impact of replacing traditional local 
markets (e.g., in a remote location) with global giants such as Wal-Mart. 
The globalisation of retailing is a process that is both complex and ongoing. 
The venture of Wal-Mart overseas may cause a change—for good or ill—among 
local cultures but, as this analysis exemplifies, the company’s application of glo-
calisation principles has improved its competitive abilities in the entire world. 
Truly, glocalisation provides the hope for success in the face of increasing global 
competition.
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